## \*\*\*1AC\*\*\*

Same as round 1

F+L

Pinker

## \*\*\*2AC\*\*\*

### Markets

#### Calculation is good and ethical

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Best studies = solves war

Hegre et al 2009 (H’vard Hegre, Professor of Political Science @University of Oslo, , John R. Oneal, Professor of Political Science @ The University of Alabama, Bruce Russett, Professor of Political Science @ Yale University) August 25, 2009 “Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict” http://www.yale-university.com/leitner/resources/docs/HORJune09.pdf

Liberals expect economically important trade to reduce conflict because interstate violence adversely affects commerce, prospectively or contemporaneously. Keshk, Reuveny, & Pollins (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) report on the basis of simultaneous analyses of these reciprocal relations that conflict impedes trade but trade does not deter conflict. Using refined measures of geographic proximity and size—the key elements in the gravity model of international interactions—reestablishes support for the liberal peace, however. Without careful specification, trade becomes a proxy for these fundamental exogenous factors, which are also important influences on dyadic conflict. KPR‘s and KR‘s results are spurious. Large, proximate states fight more and trade more. Our re-analyses show that, as liberals would expect, commerce reduces the risk of interstate conflict when proximity and size are properly modeled in both the conflict and trade equations. We provided new simultaneous estimates of liberal theory using Oneal & Russett‘s (2005) data and conflict equation and a trade model derived from Long (2008). These tests confirm the pacific benefit of trade. Trade reduces the likelihood of a fatal militarized dispute, 1950–2000 in our most comprehensive analysis, as it does in the years 1984-97 when additional measures of traders‘ expectations of domestic and interstate conflict are incorporated (Long, 2008) and in the period 1885-2000. This strong support for liberal theory is consistent with Kim‘s (1998) early simultaneous estimates, Oneal, Russett & Berbaum‘s (2003) Granger-style causality tests, and recent research by Robst, Polachek & Chang (2007). Reuveny & Kang (1998) and Reuveny (2001) report mixed results. It is particularly encouraging that, when simultaneously estimated, the coefficient of trade in the conflict equation is larger in absolute value than the corresponding value in a simple probit analysis. Thus, the dozens of published articles that have addressed the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace—as virtually all have done since 1999—have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Admittedly, our instrumental variables are not optimal. In some cases, for example, in violation of the identification rule, the creation or end of a PTA may be a casus belli. More importantly, neither of our instruments explains a large amount of variance. Thus, future research should be directed to identifying better instruments. Our confidence in the commercial peace does not depend entirely on the empirical evidence, however; it also rests on the logic of liberal theory. Our new simultaneous estimates—as well as our re-analyses of KPR and KR—indicate that fatal disputes reduce trade. Even with extensive controls for on-going domestic conflict, militarized disputes with third parties, and expert estimates of the risks of such violence, interstate conflict has an adverse contemporaneous effect on bilateral trade. This is hardly surprising (Anderton & Carter, 2001; Reuveny, 2001; Li & Sacko, 2002; Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003; Glick & Taylor, 2005; Kastner, 2007; Long, 2008; Findlay & O‘Rourke, 2007; cf. Barbieri & Levy, 1999; Blomberg & Hess, 2006; and Ward & Hoff, 2007). If conflict did not impede trade, economic agents would be indifferent to risk and the maximization of profit. Because conflict is costly, trade should reduce interstate violence. Otherwise, national leaders would be insensitive to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors. Whether paid prospectively or contemporaneously, the economic cost of conflict should reduce the likelihood of military conflict, ceteris paribus, if national leaders are rational.

### A2 Drones K

#### Drones make us accept war and conflict escalation – its makes us more cautious when using force

Charli Carpenter (associate professor of international relations at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) and Lina Shaikhouni June 7, 2011 “Don't Fear the Reaper” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/07/dont\_fear\_the\_reaper?page=0,1

Misconception No. 2: Drones Make War Easy and Game-Like, and Therefore Likelier. Remote-controlled violence even with a human in the loop also has people concerned: Nearly 40 percent of the op-eds we studied say that remote-control killing makes war too much like a video game. Many argue this increases the likelihood of armed conflict. It's a variation on an old argument: Other revolutions in military technology -- the longbow, gunpowder, the airplane -- have also progressively removed the weapons-bearer from hand-to-hand combat with his foe. Many of these advances, too, were initially criticized for degrading the professional art of war or taking it away from military elites. For example, European aristocrats originally considered the longbow and firearms unchivalrous for a combination of these reasons. It's true that all killing requires emotional distancing, and militaries throughout time have worked hard to devise ways to ease the psychological impact on soldiers of killing for the state in the national interest. Yet it's not so clear whether the so-called Nintendo effect of drones increases social distance or makes killing easier. Some anecdotal evidence suggests the opposite: Drone pilots say they suffer mental stress precisely because they have detailed, real-time images of their targets, and because they go home to their families afterward rather than debriefing with their units in the field. Studies haven't yet confirmed which view is accurate or whether it's somehow both. Even if some variant of the Nintendo effect turns out to be real, there is little evidence that distancing soldiers from the battlefield or the act of killing makes war itself more likely rather than less. If that were true, the world would be awash in conflict.

As former Lt. Col. Dave Grossman has documented, at no time in history has the combination of technology and military training strategies made killing so easy -- a trend that began after World War I. Yet as political scientist Joshua Goldstein demonstrates in a forthcoming book, the incidence of international war -- wars between two or more states -- has been declining for 70 years. The political debate over drones should move away from the fear that military advancements mean war is inevitable and instead focus on whether certain weapons and platforms are more or less useful for preventing conflict at a greater or lesser cost to innocent civilian lives. Activists should keep pressure on elected officials, military personnel, and other public institutions to make armed conflict, where it occurs, as bloodless as possible. For example, some human rights groups say the Nintendo effect itself could be harnessed to serve humanitarian outcomes -- by embedding war law programming into game designs.

#### Drones are no big deal- people actually effected support them because they don’t want terrorist criminals running rampant in their communities

Yousefzai 2012 (Zmarak Yousefzai practices national security litigation in Washington, DC for an international law firm. He was born and raised in the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, October 15, 2012, “Voice of a native son: Drones may be a necessary evil,” Foreign Policy, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/15/voice\_of\_a\_native\_son\_drones\_may\_be\_a\_necessary\_evil)

The biggest debate surrounding the Afghanistan-Pakistan region today concerns the U.S. drone program in Pakistan's tribal regions, which target the militants who terrorize and kill local residents, and who attack American soldiers inside Afghanistan. Ironically, the anti-war group CODEPINK -- members of which visited Pakistan last week to protest drone strikes -- along with much of the American left, the Pakistani establishment, and the Taliban are all on the same side in their opposition to drone strikes. While silent on the many more targeted killings of innocent civilians by Taliban militants in the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pakistani establishment and the American left both loudly criticize U.S. drone strikes, albeit for different reasons. Pakistani officials cite Pakistan's sovereignty as their main justification for opposing drone strikes. But sovereignty is neither the actual reason for their anger, nor is it a legitimate argument against drone strikes. The actual reason is that the United States blames Pakistan for its failure to clear militants out of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. FATA serves as a base for militants and is therefore the target of drone strikes. In return, Pakistan uses anti-drone campaigns to stir up anti-Americanism through the media and insists on its national sovereignty over FATA. Pakistan's sovereignty claim itself is completely invalid. Pakistan does not now nor has it ever had a complete sovereign control -- as modern nation-states define the term -- over FATA. In fact, it is precisely Pakistan's lack of sovereign control over FATA that allows the militants, many of whom are not Pakistanis, to operate so openly there and invite drone strikes. And that is the best case scenario for Pakistan; the worst case, many believe, is that Pakistan houses and trains these militants in FATA. Indeed, we just saw a fitting example of Pakistan's lack of sovereignty over FATA last week. An anti-drone march to the FATA area of Waziristan on October 7 led by Pakistan's leading politician, Imran Khan, and accompanied by CODEPINK members, failed to reach Waziristan. The march was halted when the Pakistan security forces could not guarantee the safety of the participants. Moreover, there is at least some evidence that the drone attacks are taking place with Pakistan's consent. If the Pakistani government was seriously against drone strikes, it could take a number of actions against the United States, including blocking the NATO supply route that goes through Pakistan, the way it did in late 2011 when NATO forces mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at two military posts near the border with Afghanistan. For CODEPINK and the American far left, the opposition to drone strikes rests on the idea that drones kill innocent civilians. The recently published "Living Under Drones," a report based on 130 interviews with family members of drone strike victims, studied the negative impact of drone strikes on civilians. But the debate on the drones' effectiveness and its impact on civilians is far from settled. For example, a February 2012 investigation by the Associated Press, which interviewed people inside FATA, reported that civilian casualties from drones are far lower than Pakistan civil society figures, journalists, and party officials assert publicly. Another study, relying on open-source data on reported U.S. drone strikes and terrorist activity in FATA between March 2004 and 2010, also found a negative correlation between drone strikes and militant violence. The strikes have also killed high-level Taliban leaders, like Baddrudin Haqqani and Baitullah Mehsud, and key Al-Qaeda militants, like Abu Kasha Al-Iraqi and Saleh Al-Turki. The New America Foundation estimates that around 84% of the people killed in drone strikes from 2004 to the present were al-Qaeda or Taliban militants. The drone accuracy rose to an amazing 95% in 2010. It is perhaps for these reasons that polls show that the residents of FATA, who are the target of drones, are less opposed to drones than the rest of Pakistanis who are not the target of drones. FATA residents are eight times more supportive of drones than are the rest of Pakistanis.

Moreover, a mere 48% of FATA residents believe that drones kill innocent civilians, compared to 89% of people in the rest of Pakistan. Surveys consistently find that FATA residents fear bomb blasts by Taliban and the Pakistani military more than they do drone strikes. According to the Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP), a Pakistan-based research group, when asked open-ended questions about their greatest fears, very few FATA residents ever mention drones. Even the Peshawar Declaration, a conference organized and attended by leaders of these tribal areas, showed strong support for drone strikes. That being said, there is little doubt that civilians have died in drone attacks. But that just raises the bigger question: is there a better alternative to drone strikes for counterterrorism in northwest Pakistan? To answer that question, we can look to the Swat Valley, just north of Waziristan, where 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by Taliban militants last Tuesday for advocating for girls' education. Swat, like Waziristan, has been a stronghold of the Taliban. But unlike Waziristan, Swat has not seen any drone strikes. Instead, in Swat, the only available alternative approach was taken. For much of 2007 and 2008, the people of Swat were left at the mercy of the Taliban, who operated with impunity and killed, tortured, wounded, and displaced countless people. Then, after being pressured by the United States, the Pakistani military entered Swat and conducted an operation to root out the Taliban. The military operation resulted in thousands of deaths, many more wounded, and over one million people displaced, with a quarter million refugees crammed into mere 24 camps -- the worst crisis since Rwanda in 1994, according to the United Nations. The operation also resulted in the destruction of hundreds of schools and egregious human rights violations by the Pakistani military - some of which I witnessed personally. By comparison, there are far fewer cases of displacement, civilian deaths, and other destruction in Waziristan where drone strikes are used. Nevertheless, by yet another comparison of hypocrisy, those who are loudest about casualties from U.S. drone strikes have rarely protested the far higher numbers of civilian casualties as a result of Pakistan Army operations or Taliban violence in the Swat Valley and FATA. Silenced in this double standard are the varying motives of different parties as well as the voice of the Pashtun people in these tribal areas. At least one voice -- that of this native Pashtun -- is speaking out to say that there are serious downsides to these drone strikes, but they may be a necessary evil and the lone option to combat those who are responsible for the severe suffering of our people - like Malala Yousafzai.

### Engagement Inev

**Military engagement inevitable**

Dorfman 2012 (Zach Dorfman, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, May 18, 2012, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism,” Dissent Magazine, http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605)

The rise of China notwithstanding, the **U**nited **S**tates remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million.¶ U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage.¶ The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement.¶ In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still.¶ Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview.¶ Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system.¶ In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination.¶ As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire.¶ Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants.¶ Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances.¶ This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes:¶ He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians.¶ Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake.¶ Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support.¶ The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN.¶ Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran.¶ And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

### 2AC K General

#### Perm do the aff and embrace critical border thinking- the alt would not reject the aff but rather reformulate it through the lens of the subaltern

Ramón Grosfoguel Associate professor, Department of Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley Kult 6 - Special Issue Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications. Fall 2009. Department of Culture and Identity. Roskilde University “A Decolonial Approach to Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality” http://www.postkolonial.dk/artikler/GROSFOGUEL.pdf

One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter Mignolo — following Chicana(o) thinkers such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987) and Jose David Saldivar (1997) — calls ‘critical border thinking’ (Mignolo 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefines the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism; it is a decolonial transmodern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity. A good example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are not anti-modern fundamentalists; they do not reject democracy and retreat into some form of indigenous fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as commanding while obeying or we are all equals because we are all different. What seems to be a paradoxical slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern. This leads to the question of how to transcend the imperial monologue established by the European-centric modernity.

#### Link to plan is insufficient to cause the K impact- [///]- Specificity first– empirical work and descriptive analysis should guide decision-making – creates a cultural understanding that avoids atrocity\*\*\*

Colin S. Gray, pub. date: 2003, Review of International Studies, 29, 285–295 Copyright © British International Studies Association

I interpret Payne’s argument to mean that a combination of American cultural arrogance and laziness has encouraged the view that one size and style of supposedly realist analysis must fit all. Payne’s logic does not differ notably from the ideas on ethnocentrism developed more than twenty years ago by Ken Booth in this country.15 Although I am in complete sympathy with Poore’s commentary, I cannot help but notice that even he sails perilously close to the wind of inadvertent selfcontradiction when he writes, for example: ‘For ambitious strategic culture protagonists strategic culture provides a direct challenge to the hegemony of realist theorising’. It is unsound to suggest, as does Poore here, that realist theorising can be innocent of culturalist input. He commits the same systemic error as does Desch, with his head-to-head assessment of cultural versus realist explanations of behaviour. The general Western, certainly the general American, strategic wisdom of today is powerfully anti-nuclear. This stance has everything to do with the US strategic context at present. It should be needless to add that that US context is not widely shared beyond the circle of polities who are directly the beneficiaries of the international order that the United States guards. It follows that US-authored general theory on the evils of nuclear armament is likely to be irrelevant or even misleading for actors beyond the pale of the American order. Most of the objects of concern will be polities or groups with strategic cultures not shaped by contemporary high confidence in their conventional, or unconventional asymmetrical, but non-nuclear, prowess. Stuart Poore is exactly right when he concludes that ‘[s]trategic culturalists should now be urged to generate more empirical research into particular strategic cultural cases through the use of thick description. In doing so, many new insights can be gained into cases where previously rationalist materialist explanations have exerted an over-bearing dominance’. That sounds remarkably like Ken Booth arguing a generation ago for better regional studies. Booth was correct then, as is Poore today. Those scholars may, or may not, be happy to know that the Pentagon now agrees with them, hence the creation of the new Deterrence Analysis Center to which I have referred. Strategic cultural analysis is vital because it alone – save only for old-fashioned espionage, of course – can make sense of those material factors which realist beliefs are utterly unable to decode. To illustrate, what would a general, acultural, theory of strategy have told us about German rearmament in the 1930s? Did that military recovery have some immanent meaning, totally unambiguous to the well-schooled realist? Of course it did not. If the first question to pose was ‘what is Germany acquiring?’, the second was ‘what does Germany intend to do with it?’ That all important second question could not be answered according to some presumed-tobe general truth about military balance and imbalance. The behaviour of statesmen is influenced, or more, by their beliefs. Cultural analysis is methodologically near impossible if, following Johnston’s mighty efforts, one seeks falsifiable theory. The reason is because culture is literally everywhere: it is too pervasive, yet elusive, for its influence to be isolated for rigorous assessment. Although I distinguish culture as an identifiable dimension of strategy, also I claim that ‘all dimensions of strategy are cultural’.16 That is why I welcome Poore’s advice to treat with authority ‘context all the way down’. I do not think that I was confused as between what was cultural and what was not, because it has long been clear to me that everything with strategic significance is chosen, employed, or interpreted, according to some particular ideational set that we can call cultural. Somewhat belatedly, faint but pursuing, I have come to appreciate that cultural analysis of strategic matters is as valid and essential as it is likely to thwart the scholarly architect of general theory. Poore is right. We need empirically thick studies of societies of interest, always remembering that we must filter what we learn through the distorting lens of our own culture. The way forward is well signposted: more empirical investigation of actual beliefs and attitudes (as contrasted with merely presumed beliefs and attitudes); no more drawing of false distinctions between realist and culturalist explanations; and a moratorium on noble endeavours to build falsifiable general theory. Some political leaders, with the more or less enthusiastic support of their societies, will deploy their army for defence, some for offence, and others will try to employ it to slaughter their neighbours, foreign and even domestic. Thus do the two commentaries that I have addressed coalesce. There is no abstract, rational, realist strategic logic which determines completely what an army should be about. Whether or not an army is unleashed to commit mass murder, depends very largely upon the beliefs of its chieftains. To that extent at least, Martin Shaw and I are in total accord. Whereas Poore’s essay usefully and justly urges me to be more consistent in my treatment of culture in context, my differences with Shaw extend to the very identity of the contexts that shape and give meaning to behaviour. In my world view, we face strategic problems that require strategic, certainly grand strategic rather than narrowly military strategic, answers. In other words, I believe that strategy is hero, not villain. When I said, perhaps unkindly, that I find Shaw empirically challenged, what I had in mind was that every one of the atrocity events of recent history that he and I both deplore, either was, or could have been, prevented or halted only by strategic behaviour. Whether warfare remains, as at present, mainly an intra- and trans- state event, or whether it migrates back to the stratospheric unpleasantness of great-power struggle, it must occur in a context wherein the logic of strategy rules. The sadly imperfect answer to our troubles of insecurity lies in the practice of effective strategy by a guardian power, with some assistance from others. Whether or not he so intended, Carl von Clausewitz wrote about war for all time, not just for a period that now may be dismissed as the era of ‘old wars’.17 If we will the ends we have to will the means, and we must be prepared to make choices we would prefer to evade. An international order consistent with our definition of the good enough life, has to be protected by someone. If the genocides and slaughters that we all abhor are not to become routine, then we have to choose to unleash primarily American military power, the only global source of strategic effectiveness reliably able to do the job. Given his concerns, Shaw should be writing in praise of American strategy.

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Jonas 1996 Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

#### Violence is objectively decreasing due to western reason and liberal democracy- spreading those ideals is key to solve conflict

Pinker 2011 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

With all its wars, murder and genocide, history might suggest that the taste for blood is human nature. Not so, argues Harvard Prof. Steven Pinker. He talks to WSJ's Gary Rosen about the decline in violence in recent decades and his new book, "The Better Angels of Our Nature." But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals. Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence. The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control. These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves. The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back. Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people. \* \* \* \* Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### Not the root cause of conflict – other factors overwhelm

Volf 2002 Miroslav Volf (Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School since 1998) Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1-1-02

Though “otherness”–cultural, ethnic, religious, racial difference–is an important factor in our relations with others, we should not overestimate it as a cause of conflict. During the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990′s, I was often asked, “What is this war about? Is it about religious and cultural differences? Is it about economic advantage? Is it about political power? Is it about land?” The correct response was, of course, that the war was about all of these things. Monocausal explanations of major eruptions of violence are rarely right. Moreover, various causes are intimately intertwined, and each contributes to others. That holds true also for otherness, which I am highlighting here. However, neither should we underestimate otherness as a factor. The contest for political power, for economic advantage, and for a share of the land took place between people who belonged to discrete cultural and ethnic groups. Part of the goal of the war in the former Yugoslavia was the creation of ethnically clean territories with economic and political autonomy. The importance of “otherness” is only slightly diminished if we grant that the sense of ethnic and religious belonging was manipulated by unscrupulous, corrupt, and greedy politicians for their own political and economic gain. The fact that conjured fears for one’s identity could serve to legitimize a war whose major driving force lay elsewhere is itself a testimony to how much “otherness” matters.

#### Alt is impossible- Status competition is hardwired into human nature

Wohlforth 2009 William C. Wohlforth (a professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

### 2AC Mignolio

#### International relations can be known through rigorous study- key to policy relevance

Frieden and Lake 2005 Jeffry A. Frieden is a professor of government at Harvard University and David A. Lake is a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science July 2005 “International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance” lexis

Our primary argument is that progress in the study of international politics— including in making its lessons more relevant to policy—depends on more, not less, rigorous theory and more, not less, systematic empirical testing. This argument is sure to be controversial, as many assessments of the policy relevance of International Relations plead for midlevel theories, contingent propositions, and empirically grounded generalizations drawn from the intense study of particular cases.5 Although we do not object to these means, we believe that the accuracy—thus relevance— of international relations as a discipline requires that it become more scientific in approach. Although policy makers need situationally specific guidance, it would be a mistake to make this the ambition of the discipline. Relevance requires better theory and better-designed tests to fulfill the expectations and needs of those who make policy, or simply those who want to understand better our complex world. In short, International Relations is most useful not when its practitioners use their detailed empirical knowledge to offer opinions, however intelligent and well informed, but when they can identify with some confidence the causal forces that drive foreign policy and international interactions. The more we can claim to “know” with confidence, the more useful and relevant the discipline will be.

#### Epistemology doesn’t indict observations of material reality

Wendt 2000 (Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security and PolSci, Ohio State, 2000 On the Via Media, Review of International Studies 26)

In the book I argue that, compared to ontology-talk, the value of epistemology talk for a discipline like IR is considerably less than something as imposing as the third ‘Great Debate’ might suggest. What matters more is what there is, not how we can know it, since we clearly do know things, and the ‘how’ of this knowledge will necessarily vary with the many different kinds of questions we ask in our field, and the varied tools at our disposal for answering them.

#### Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline

Wendt**,** Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### Nuke power is progress- Blind rejection causes regression to worse alternatives

Hummel 2012 (William Hummel, BA Pomona University, May 1, 2012, “Environmental Critiques of Nuclear Energy,” http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=pomona\_theses)

Ultimately, we environmentalists ought to agree on two major points: the first is that we must quickly phase out harmful fossil fuel technologies that emit tons of GHG into the atmosphere and are the major drivers of anthropogenic climate change. And secondly, governments around the world must support the development of green technology and renewable energy sources.¶ Nuclear power falls somewhere between these two positions. If we had to choose whether to burn fossil fuels or split atoms for our electricity, we ought to pick nuclear energy sources. And if we could choose between nuclear power and renewables, we ought to construct windmills and deploy solar cells. But for the moment, neither of these choices is realistic. Serious efforts to quickly phase out coal, petroleum, and natural gas will almost surely necessitate the construction of nuclear reactors. There will be energy deficits as we move away from fossil fuel technologies, and unless it is clear that we can provide sufficient amounts of energy with renewables, environmentalists should support nuclear development, and insist upon more nuclear research. This support should be skeptical and reserved: as we have seen, there are problems associated with nuclear energy, and environmentalists should simultaneously work to address the concerns outlined above. Reactors don’t emit significant amounts of GHG, but that doesn’t mean we ought to support such technology unconditionally. And conversely, skeptics should remember that nuclear power plants are—from an environmental standpoint—preferable to fossil fuel technology.

Blind opposition to nuclear technology may leave us with the same coal plants that environmentalists agree are devastating our planet’s climate, and its inhabitants.

#### A transition away from modernity causes massive wars- even those who are supposedly excluded now will continue to push for growth

Barnhizer, 6 David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife.

What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. 60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped.

Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior. Many developing country groups involved in efforts to protect the environment and resist the impacts of free trade on their communities have been concerned with the harmful effects of economic change. Part of the concern is the increased scale of economic activity. Some concerns relate to who benefits and who loses in the changing context imposed by globalization. These concerns are legitimate and understandable. So are the other deep currents running beneath their political positions, including those of resistance to change of any kind and a [\*621] rejection of the market approach to economic activities. In the system described inaccurately as free market capitalism, economic activity not only breaks down existing systems, it creates new systems and--as Joseph Schumpeter observed--continually repeats the process through cycles of "creative destruction." 61 This pattern of creative destruction unfolds as necessarily and relentlessly as does the birth-maturation-death-rebirth cycle of the natural environment. This occurs even in a self-sufficient or autarkic market system capable of managing all variables within its closed dominion. But when the system breaks out of its closed environment, the ability of a single national actor to control the system's dynamics erodes and ultimately disappears in the face of differential conditions, needs, priorities, and agendas. Globalization's ability to produce wealth for a particular group simultaneously produces harms to different people and interests and generates unfair resource redistribution within existing cultures. This is an unavoidable consequence of globalization. 62 The problem is that globalization has altered the rules of operation of political, economic, and social activities, and in doing so multiplied greatly our ability to create benefit and harm. 63 While some understandably want the unsettling and often chaotic effects of globalization to go away, it can only be dealt with, not reversed. The system in which we live and work is no longer closed. There are few contexts not connected to the dynamics of some aspect of the extended economic and social systems resulting from globalization. This means the wide ranging and incompatible variables of a global economic, human rights, and social fairness system are resulting in conflicts and unanticipated interpenetrations that no one fully understands, anticipates, or controls. 64 Local [\*622] self-sufficiency is the loser in this process. It can remain a nostalgic dream but rarely a reality. Except for isolated cultures and niche activities, there is very little chance that anyone will be unaffected by this transformational process. Change is the constant, and it will take several generations before we return to a period of relative stasis. Even then it will only be a respite before the pattern once again intensifies.

#### The distinction between the Eurocentric modern and colonial other is an insufficient explanation for violence

Miroslav Volf (Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School since 1998) Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1-1-02  
Though “otherness”–cultural, ethnic, religious, racial difference–is an important factor in our relations with others, we should not overestimate it as a cause of conflict. During the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990′s, I was often asked, “What is this war about? Is it about religious and cultural differences? Is it about economic advantage? Is it about political power? Is it about land?” The correct response was, of course, that the war was about all of these things. Monocausal explanations of major eruptions of violence are rarely right. Moreover, various causes are intimately intertwined, and each contributes to others. That holds true also for otherness, which I am highlighting here. However, neither should we underestimate otherness as a factor. The contest for political power, for economic advantage, and for a share of the land took place between people who belonged to discrete cultural and ethnic groups. Part of the goal of the war in the former Yugoslavia was the creation of ethnically clean territories with economic and political autonomy. The importance of “otherness” is only slightly diminished if we grant that the sense of ethnic and religious belonging was manipulated by unscrupulous, corrupt, and greedy politicians for their own political and economic gain. The fact that conjured fears for one’s identity could serve to legitimize a war whose major driving force lay elsewhere is itself a testimony to how much “otherness” matters.

#### Blaming imperialism for all oppression masks more violent forms of oppression – prefer our evidence, its comparative

Fred **Halliday** (Middle East Report) **1999** “The Middle East at the Millennial Turn” http://www.merip.org/mer/mer213/213\_hallliday.html

Recent developments in the Middle East and the onset of new global trends and uncertainties pose a challenge not only to those who live in the region but also to those who engage it from outside. Here, too, previously-established patterns of thought and commitment are now open to question. The context of the l960s, in which journals such as MERIP Reports (the precursor of this publication) and the Journal of the North American Committee on Latin America (NACLA) were founded, was one of solidarity with the struggles of Third World peoples and opposition to external, imperialist intervention. That agenda remains valid: Gross inequalities of wealth, power and access to rights–a.k.a. imperialism–persist. This agenda has been enhanced by political and ethical developments in subsequent decades. Those who struggle include not only the national groups (Palestinians and Kurds) oppressed by chauvinist regimes and the workers and peasants (remember them?) whose labor sustains these states, but now also includes analyses of gender oppression, press and academic suppression and the denial of ecological security. The agenda has also elaborated a more explicit stress on individual rights in tandem with the defense of collective rights. History itself and the changing intellectual context of the West have, however, challenged this emancipatory agenda in some key respects. On the one hand, oppression, denial of rights and military intervention are not the prerogative of external states alone: An anti-imperialism that cannot recognize–and denounce–indigenous forms of dictatorship and aggression, or that seeks, with varying degrees of exaggeration, to blame all oppression and injustice on imperialism, is deficient. The Iranian Revolution, Ba‘thist Iraq, confessional militias in Lebanon, armed guerrilla groups in a range of countries, not to mention the Taliban in Afghanistan, often represent a much greater immediate threat to human rights and the principles in whose name solidarity was originally formulated than does Western imperialism. Islamist movements from below meet repressive states from above in their conduct. What many people in the region want is not less external involvement but a greater commitment by the outside world, official and non-governmental, to protecting and realizing rights that are universally proclaimed but seldom respected. At the same time, in a congruence between relativist renunciation from the region and critiques of "foundationalist" and Enlightenment thinking in the West, doubt has been cast on the very ethical foundation of solidarity: a belief in universal human rights and the possibility of a solidarity based on such rights. Critical engagement with the region is now often caught between a denunciation of the West's failure actively to pursue the democratic and human rights principles it proclaims and a rejection of the validity of these principles as well as the possibility of any external encouragement of them. This brings the argument back to the critique of Western policy, and of the relation of that critique to the policy process itself. On human rights and democratization, official Washington and its European friends continue to speak in euphemism and evasion. But the issue here is not to see all US involvement as inherently negative, let alone to denounce all international standards of rights as imperialist or ethnocentric, but rather, to hold the US and its European allies accountable to the universal principles they proclaim elsewhere. An anti-imperialism of disengagement serves only to reinforce the hold of authoritarian regimes and oppressive social practices within the Middle East.

#### No Impact - Western power and imperialism doesn’t foster violent interventions

Martin **Shaw** (Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex) April **2001** “The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State” http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/CGPE/Failed%20States/shaw.pdf

Furthermore, Western leaders have consistently sought to shore up failed and failing (semi-) authoritarian state structures, rather than supporting their break-ups. The West has supported central Russian power throughout all the vicissitudes of the Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin regimes. The West has maintained a 'constructive' relationship with Chinese Communism through Tiananmen Square and all subsequent phases of repression. The eastern advances of NATO and the European Union have responded largely to the demands of local elites and populations - as well as to the fear of further state breakdown in regions close to Western Europe. Even after the West had defeated the Saddam regime in the Gulf War, and even as the latter waged genocidal war on Shi'ites and Kurds, it was reluctant to countenance the break-up of the Iraqi state. Likewise, the West's early response to the Yugoslav crisis was to try to shore up a federal state that was ceasing to exist, condoning the early atrocities of the Yugoslav National Army; after several years of war, it still backed Milosevic's Serbia as a force for stability. Only long after it became clear that the latter was leading to new wars, in Kosovo and (threatened) in Montenegro, did Western leaders move reluctantly to confront Serbia. Thus it was not only in East Timor, where the historically pro-Western Indonesian regime was the oppressor, that the West supported the existing centre and was late in coming to the rescue of the victims of genocide. Generally, therefore, Western power generally supports the maintenance of state structures even where these are dominated by regimes that are anti-Western as well as repressive. More extreme cases of 'state collapse' have tended to occur in countries like Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone that have been of minimal or declining strategic and economic significance. In these cases, even more than in Iraq or Yugoslavia, Western elites have generally been extremely reluctant to intervene. The more credible charge against the West is not that it intervenes widely in support of its own interests, but that: it avoids intervention and tolerates even genocidal repression, where its own interests are not strongly engaged; its interventions are therefore consistently late in responding to state and human crises;Page 18 18 its interventions are often half-baked, appeasing local elites and failing to anticipate events; its national elites are unwilling to risk even small numbers of 'their' soldiers, even when the lives of large numbers of non-Western civilians are at risk; it is disinterested in the strong development of global institutions, preferring ad hoc structures that it can manipulate to genuine global democratic governance. In what sense, then, can contemporary Western power be said to represent an advance on historic European empires and Cold War American power? The above is hardly a positive appraisal. Indeed, the main positive advantages of Western power lie in its internal characteristics (internationalisation and democratisation) rather than in the development of a positive post- imperial relationship with the non-Western world. The principal challenges to empire, authoritarianism and repression come today from civil society and social movements, rather than from the Western state.

#### Anti-imperialist strategies distort struggles for real global justice – resorting in massive violence in the periphery of your anti-western struggle

Martin **Shaw** (Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex) April **2001** “The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State” http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/CGPE/Failed%20States/shaw.pdf

It is worth asking how the politics of anti-imperialism distorts Western leftists' responses to global struggles for justice. John Pilger, for example, consistently seeks to minimise the crimes of Milosevic in Kosovo, and to deny their genocidal character - purely because these crimes formed part of the rationale for Western intervention against Serbia. He never attempted to minimise the crimes of the pro-Western Suharto regime in the same way. The crimes of quasi-imperial regimes are similar in cases like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, but the West's attitudes towards them are undeniably uneven and inconsistent. To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy, rather than the demands for justice of the victims of oppression as such, distorts our responses to the victims and our commitment to justice. We need to support the victims regardless of whether Western governments take up their cause or not; we need to judge Western power not according to a general assumption of 'new imperialism' but according to its actual role in relation to the victims.

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### Neolib

#### “Soft energy” uptopia impossible- alt causes reversion to coal

Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2011 (Ted Nordhaus, chairman of the Breakthrough Instiute, and Michael Shellenberger, president of the Breakthrough Insitute, MA cultural anthropology from University of California, Santa Cruz, February 25, 2011, http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/the\_long\_death\_of\_environmenta)

Seventh, we need to acknowledge that the so-called "soft energy path" is a dead end. The notion that the nation might meet its future energy needs through renewable energy and low cost energy efficiency has defined virtually all environmental energy proposals since the 1960s, and was codified into dogma by anti-nuclear activist turned efficiency consultant, Amory Lovins, in his 1976 Foreign Affairs article. Lovins claimed that efficiency would allow America to dramatically reduce its total energy use and that renewable energy technologies like wind and solar power were ready to replace fossil fuels.¶ But the reality is that for centuries, the global economy has used ever more energy, even as it has used energy ever more efficiently and renewable energy, which Lovins and others were claiming even as early as the late 1970's was cheaper than fossil energy, remains expensive and difficult to scale. Renewables still cost vastly more than fossil based energy, even before we calculate the costs associated with storing and transmitting intermittent forms of energy. Wind energy, according to the latest EIA estimates, still costs 50% more than coal or gas. Solar costs three to five times as much. In the end, what the soft energy path has given us is coal-fired power plants, mountaintop removal, global warming, and an economy that uses 50% more energy, not solar panels and wind farms.

### Drones

#### Their ev is backwards- selection bias- increased violence prompted the strikes, not the other way around

Johnston 2012 (Patrick B. Johnston, Associate Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, Anoop Sarbahi, post-doctoral researcher at Stanford, February 25, 2012, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf)

This research note has presented an analysis of the relationship between US drone strikes and militant violence in northwestern Pakistan. Initial analysis showed a positive correlation between drone strikes and militant violence. This correlation appears to be attributable to selection bias—as the war in northwestern Pakistan has intensified, the US has increasingly turned to direct action counterterrorism, primarily through drone strikes. After controlling for local factors and time trends, we found evidence of a negative correlation. But even though there is suggestive evidence that drones strikes have yielded counterterrorism dividends, caution should be exercised in inferring causality due to the selection bias inherent in the data.

### Science IR

#### Expert debates on policy options are key to deal with crises- academics should constantly be on call

Frieden and Lake 2005 Jeffry A. Frieden is a professor of government at Harvard University and David A. Lake is a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science July 2005 “International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance” lexis

International relationists have long been involved in foreign policy debates. The pages of thoughtful journals of opinion like Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy are often filled by academics writing for broad audiences. And professors, of course, have frequently engaged in government service. There will always be a need for policy-relevant expertise. Through a lifetime of study, even the most theoretically inclined academics accumulate substantial country- or policy-specific knowledge that can supplement that possessed by those in government. Universities are repositories of country and policy experts “on call” to buttress hard-pressed policy makers confronted with crises in countries or over issues for which they lack immediate knowledge.

### Speed

#### Virilio’s myopic view of technology and speed makes political engagement impossible and denies individual agency – turns your value to life arguments and proves that the plan can minimize the negative aspects of tech and speed

Douglas **Kellner** (Ph.D., Philosophy, Columbia University) **1999** “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/ illuminations/kell29.htm)

Virilio misses a key component of the drama of technology in the present age and that is the titanic struggle between national and international governments and corporations to control the structure, flows, and content of the new technologies in contrast to the struggle of individuals and social groups to use the new technologies for their own purposes and projects. This optic posits technology as a contested terrain, as a field of struggle between competing social groups and individuals trying to use the new technologies for their own projects. Despite his humanism, there is little agency or politics in Virilio's conceptual universe

and he does not delineate the struggles between various social groups for the control of the new technologies and the new politics that they will produce. Simply by damning, demonizing and condemning new technologies, Virilio substitutes moralistic critique for social analysis and political action, reducing his analysis to a lament and jeremiad rather than an ethical and political critique Œ la Ellul and his tradition of Catholic critique of contemporary civilization, or critical social theory. Virilio has no theory of justice, no politics to counter, reconstruct, reappropriate, or transform technology, no counterforces that can oppose technology. Thus, the increasing shrillness of his lament, the rising hysteria, and sense of futile impotence. While Virilio's take on technology is excessively negative and technophobic, his work is still of importance in understanding the great transformation currently underway. Clearly, speed and the instantaneity and simultaneity of information are more important to the new economy and military than ever before, so Virilio's reflections on speed, technology, politics, and culture are extremely relevant. Yet he seems so far to have inadequately conceptualized the enormous changes wrought by an infotainment society and the advent of a new kind of multimedia information-entertainment technology. If my hunch is correct, his view of technology and speed is integrally structured by his intense focus on war and the military, while his entire mode of thought is a form of military-technological determinism which forces him not only to overlook the important role of capital, but also the complex ambiguities, the mixture of positive and negative features, of the new technologies now proliferating and changing every aspect of society and culture in the present era. Virilio thus emerges as a highly useful theorist of the post-World War Two and Cold War era of the military with the domination of military technology and military capitalism, but he never analyses the complicity of capitalism and those economic forces that deploy technology for power and profit, instead putting all blame for contemporary problems on technology and its deployment by the military and perhaps the state. But against Virilio, it should be recognized that new technologies are part of the capitalist project, that capital recognizes, along with Marx, that surplus value is gained by productive deployment of new technologies, and that technology provides powerful weapons of profit and social control.